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Abstract
This paper offers three guiding principles for a better relationship between the economy and 
democracy: democracy as the extension of citizenship; democracy as diversity; and democracy 
as complementary to clear, strong macroeconomic rules. This view, it is argued, implies that 
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ity of the market, social cohesion and democracy. The central role of economic and social rights 
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José Antonio Ocampo1
Developing countries are familiar with the dramatic gap between the expectations raised and the outcomes 
actually achieved by the reforms undertaken to broaden the role of the market in economic processes, 
and with a similar gap between expectations and outcomes associated with the extension of democratic 
regimes. This phenomenon reﬂ  ects a more widespread problem: how to generate a good relationship 
between the market, social cohesion and democracy in a globalized world. The tensions among these 
elements are manifest in both industrialized and developing countries, but it is in the latter that they are 
particularly acute.
Latin America provides the best, if not the only, example. This was the developing region in 
which the adoption of market reforms coincided at a very early stage, and in a generalized fashion, with 
the consolidation of representative democracy. This coincidence was judged by some authors as a sig-
nal event in the history of Latin American democracy (see, for example, Domínguez and Purcell, 1999). 
It allows us to see more clearly how both the economic and political reform processes are linked to the 
frustrations expressed by the citizenry. In fact, as is evident from the regional surveys by Latinobarómetro 
(2004), while in 2004, 72 per cent of the population considered democracy to be the only system that 
would allow their countries to become industrial economies and 53 per cent considered it the best system 
of government, only 29 per cent felt satisﬁ  ed with its functioning. Similarly, although the majority of the 
Latin American population thought that the market economy was the only system through which their 
country could become developed (60 per cent), the percentage showing satisfaction with its results was 
even lower than in the case for democracy (19 per cent).
This paper analyses ways in which better relations between the market, social cohesion and 
democracy can be built. It begins by offering three guiding principles for a better relationship between the 
economy and democracy. The second section examines the role of national institutions in improving that 
relationship. The third section presents some succinct considerations regarding international institutions, 
and the fourth draws brief conclusions.
Principles for the relationship between the economy and democracy
Democracy is the extension of citizenship
The point of departure of this paper is that democracy means much more than a democratic regime.2 A 
democratic regime can be deﬁ  ned in terms of electoral institutions, mutual balance and control of powers, 
responsibilities of the majority and rights of minorities. Democracy has a wider meaning, rooted in the ex-
tension of the concept of equality before the law and, therefore, of the rights associated with citizenship, 
which can be understood in a broad sense as civil, political and social citizenship.
1  This paper has beneﬁ  ted from discussions over the years with some friends and colleagues, especially Carlos 
Vicente de Roux, Eugenio Lahera, Manuel Marfán, Ernesto Ottone and Juan Carlos Ramírez, and from discussions 
with Dante Caputo, Arturo O’Connel and Guillermo O’Donnell during seminars held within the framework of the 
UNDP project on Democracy in Latin America (UNDP, 2004), for which an earlier version was prepared. 
2  This is the central message of UNDP (2004) on democracy in Latin America, itself based on O’Donnell (2002).2  DESA Working Paper No. 9
This powerful concept of democracy can thus be identiﬁ  ed with the modern and richer view of 
citizenship that goes beyond civil and political rights. It ties democracy to the effective expansion not 
only of civil and political rights, which guarantee individual autonomy before the state and participation 
in public decisions, but of economic, social and cultural rights, which respond to the values of equality, 
solidarity and non-discrimination (ECLAC, 2001).
These interrelated views of democracy and citizenship also underline the universality, indivisibil-
ity and interdependence of human rights, an understanding that has emerged largely as a result of a long 
historical process. In terms of their character, enforceability and mechanisms of protection, civil and po-
litical rights are governed by legal statutes that differ from those that refer to economic, social and cultural 
rights. Nonetheless, they are all part and parcel of the fundamental rights of people, recognized by corre-
sponding international declarations and covenants. Furthermore, where there is limited or no progress on 
economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights, laboriously attained in many cases, tend to 
lose signiﬁ  cance for the poor segments of society.
The recognition of equality of all individuals before the law is perhaps the most important 
achievement of the modern era. It was associated with the development of modern capitalism, which 
demanded recognition of those who transact in the market as equals before the law. In economic thought, 
this concept has had a contemporary renaissance in institutional economics, which has put emphasis on 
both equality before the law and respect for property rights as essential elements for reducing transaction 
costs and, consequently, for the proper functioning of markets (North, 1990).
However, a considerable historical literature, both political and economic, has highlighted the 
tension that also exists between social equality and property rights, inasmuch as property rights effec-
tively consolidate the inequality in the distribution of wealth and income generated by the functioning of 
markets. The focus on this tension accounts for the ambivalent relationship between liberal thought and 
democracy, that still exists today (see, for example, Bobbio, 1990).
Resolving the tension   albeit never fully   between equality and property rights has been possible 
only through a gradual evolution of political citizenship, which has incorporated the principles of social 
citizenship throughout history. The development of these principles has led to redistributive policies that 
compensate inequality generated or reproduced by market forces. At the same time, it has led to economic 
regulations that directly target the relationship between the functioning of markets and the distribution 
of wealth and income. In this way, the expansion of social citizenship has implied the expansion of the 
regulatory and re-distributive roles of the state. Proponents of free markets consider these interventions to 
be a source of “distortions” in the functioning of markets, or even blatant restrictions of property rights. In 
fact, different schools of economic thought are deeply divided on this question.
As a corollary, these state interventions must be analysed in relation to their effects on the func-
tioning of markets as well as in relation to the beneﬁ  ts they generate (Atkinson, 1999). This means that 
the efﬁ  cacy of these interventions depends on their capacity to reduce inequalities generated by market 
forces and also on the beneﬁ  ts which society derives from a greater degree of equality and social cohe-
sion. These beneﬁ  ts could include the positive effects of better income distribution on economic growth as 
well as the investment appeal of a society characterized by higher levels of social cohesion and political 
stability.Market, Social Cohesion, and Democracy  3
In highly unequal societies, overcoming the tension between the above principles becomes espe-
cially complex. First and foremost, ensuring equal opportunities is in itself difﬁ  cult because disadvantage 
is not due to any one single factor, but to a combination thereof. That is why the provision of equal oppor-
tunities demands positive action for those in dissimilar situations.
Moreover, equality of opportunities is an insufﬁ  cient objective. In fact, merit as a factor of mobil-
ity gives rise to social ascent or descent and, in the long run, generates inequality of opportunities. On the 
other hand, if a society provides inadequate opportunities to a broad segment of the population during the 
earlier stages of their lives, the result can, to a large extent, be irreparable losses. For example, malnutri-
tion during childhood can make it difﬁ  cult to attain the minimal levels of education necessary to secure a 
decent opportunity in the job market. This accounts for the need to have policies that may compensate for 
the inequality of life trajectories, and not only of opportunities.
In this view of democracy and citizenship, social equality is an objective in itself, as the true 
expression of the collective aims that move societies and, therefore, as a basic principle of social cohe-
sion. Therefore, the defence of economic, social and cultural rights and their gradual redeﬁ  nition in more 
complex forms (Borja, 2002) become the very purpose of development.
The indivisibility of these rights raises, nonetheless, complex issues. For example, the political 
declaration of “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions” (Article 
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) does not allow for the creation 
of wealth or for distributing what is non-existent. Its instrumentation must be compatible, therefore, with 
the level of development achieved and, as we shall see, with the ﬁ  scal situation prevailing in each society 
in order to avoid resulting in unfulﬁ  lled expectations or macroeconomic imbalances, which may affect, 
through other channels, the very social sectors that are meant to be protected. Equity, in this sense, must 
be understood as involving the creation of targets which the society may be in a position to effectively 
achieve, given its level of development. That is to say, its point of reference is that which can be realized, 
but nothing less, and therefore aims at maximizing the realizable.
This having been said, it is necessary to bear in mind that the counterparts of rights are the 
responsibilities and obligations of the members of society who stake their claims on the corresponding 
social beneﬁ  ts (Palme, 2000). These responsibilities include the contribution (according to capacity) to 
production, compliance with tax obligations and participation in the public sphere.
Democracy is diversity
The second essential concept for analysing the relationship between the economy and democracy can be 
formulated simply as: democracy is diversity. Citizenship is meaningless when citizens lack options for 
making choices. Fortunately, history shows that even market economies are characterized by diversity 
due to the existence of different “varieties of capitalism”, to use the term expressed by Albert (1993) and 
Rodrik (1999) expression.
In fact, despite the trend towards strengthened market relations, the modern world continues to 
exhibit variations in the mix between the state and the market. In the industrialized countries, models 
range from the limited welfare state of the United States to the elaborate welfare states of the European 4  DESA Working Paper No. 9
continent (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). In Latin America, we ﬁ  nd countries that allocate 4-6 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) to social spending, and others, like Uruguay, which allocate more than 20 
per cent (ECLAC, 2004: chap. 4). There are models of radical privatization of state enterprises, and others 
where such a process has been limited. Also, there are different models for restructuring social security, 
with varying components of solidarity and different mixtures of public and private participation.
Moreover, this view enjoys the backing of the notion that even though the basic functions of the 
institutions may be the same, the particular form they adopt varies (Rodrik, 2001). This reﬂ  ects the fact 
that institutional development demands an active process of learning, which gives rise to different out-
comes. It implies that institutional development (“institutional capital”), as well as the building of mecha-
nisms of social cohesion (“social capital”), are essentially endogenous processes. Indeed, this is a charac-
teristic that they share with human capital and technological capacity (“knowledge capital”).
On the other hand, this view militates against market fundamentalism, which holds that there 
is only one desirable model of development applicable to all countries under all circumstances and sees 
the “market economy” as being antagonistic to state interventionism. The importance of this view has 
declined during the last few years, thanks to the recognition accorded to institutional development and, 
therefore, to the state being complementary to the market, and to the recognition of the crucial impor-
tance of “ownership” of national policies for the effective deployment of development assistance. It must, 
however, be underlined that these principles often clash with the conditionalities attached to international 
ﬁ  nancial cooperation (see the section on international institutions below).
A revisionist view is that of “generations of reforms”, which holds that, to overcome the problems 
experienced by developing economies with the liberalization processes, it is necessary to complement the 
ﬁ  rst generation of reforms with a second one. The lines between the “generations” of reforms have be-
come confusing. Even the ﬁ  rst generation reforms, associated with economic liberalization and macroeco-
nomic discipline, have been subjected to different interpretations and emphases in their implementation, 
inviting wide-ranging polemics. The “second generation” of reforms has as many meanings as there are 
possible interpretations of what appropriate institutional development (their major focus) should be. The 
need to improve the results of reforms in terms of equity and to place this objective at the centre of policy 
agendas, may be seen as a call for a third generation of reforms.
This is not the best way to deal with the need for change. The concept of “generations” of reforms 
implies linear and universal processes in which the achievements of previous stages prevail in unmodiﬁ  ed 
forms as foundations for building new ﬂ  oors of a building. However, the fragility of some foundations can 
lead to problems that can only be resolved at later stages. This is, for example, what occurs in the cases of 
liberalization that result in higher levels of macroeconomic instability, destruction of productive and tech-
nological capacities that are not replaced by new ones, or increasing dualism in the productive structures. 
In such cases, it will be necessary to “reform the reforms” (Ffrench-Davis, 2000; ECLAC, 2001).
The same terminological confusion underlies the idea that it is necessary to “consolidate” the 
reforms. There is a minimum substrata around which a certain degree of consensus exists: a consolida-
tion of macroeconomic achievements with respect to the reduction of inﬂ  ation and the improvement in 
public sector accounts; an opening up to the opportunities offered by integration into the international 
economy; a broader participation of the private sector in the development process; and the need for more 
efﬁ  cient states. All these terms, however, have different meanings for different analysts as, in fact, there is Market, Social Cohesion, and Democracy  5
no single model of macroeconomic management that could guarantee stability (including, as we see later, 
differences of what is meant by “macroeconomic stability”). Moreover, there is no single way to integrate 
into the international economy or to combine the efforts of the public and the private sectors. These differ-
ences are reﬂ  ected both in the industrialized and the developing world, where the diverse solutions to the 
problems posed by this minimum consensus are, at times, more important than the supposed homogeneity 
of the “market economy”.
In reality, the idea that there must be some unique pattern, style or model of development ap-
plicable to all countries is not only ahistorical, but also damaging and contrary to democracy. Support for 
democracy is linked to the recognition that democracy generates a diversity of solutions to the problems 
of the people.
Democracy and clear, strong macroeconomic rules are complementary
A positive evaluation of diversity should not lead us to lose sight of the fact that, on more than one occa-
sion, some policies have destroyed the foundations on which economic systems function, thereby falling 
into the category of “economic populism”, to use a concept suggested a few years ago by Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1989).
Although this concept has not been used in a systematic manner in contemporary debates, it is 
used—as we do here—to refer to macroeconomic practices that result in temporary prosperity but that 
inexorably lead to crises due to the unsustainable nature of the public and private spending they entail. 
The concept has also been used to refer to policies aimed at redistributing income through forms of eco-
nomic regulation that distort the functioning of markets, but it is difﬁ  cult to differentiate such a meaning 
of “populism” from state intervention in a broader sense.
The concept of “economic populism” has thus been rightly criticized for its lack of precision and 
unclear relationship to the concept of populism developed in political science, where it refers to particular 
forms of mass mobilization based on the promises of social welfare. Actually, “economic populism”, as 
deﬁ  ned above, has been practiced in more than one case by non-populist political regimes, including dic-
tatorial regimes and even by seemingly very orthodox economic authorities. This is true, for example, of 
countries that have used periods of euphoria in international capital markets to accelerate ﬁ  nancial liberal-
ization. Accompanied by overvaluation of national currencies and other macroeconomic imbalances, this 
can unleash accelerated expansion of public and private spending and, later, deep macroeconomic crises. 
It might be better, therefore, to refer to these policies as “facile macroeconomics” rather than “populism”.3
However, the most important corollary of this ambiguous process is that the progress of democ-
racy and the establishment of clear and strong macroeconomic rules should not be seen as antagonistic, 
but rather as complementary. There are at least two strong reasons for this. The ﬁ  rst is that, for any public 
policy to be efﬁ  cient and sustainable, there has to be consistency between the different goals established by 
the authorities. In actual fact, the lack of consistency has been one of the main reasons for the painful ad-
justments in macroeconomic policies during the 1980s and the more recent crises in the developing world.
The second is that all forms of macroeconomic instability are costly, not only in economic but 
also in social terms. The regressive effects of inﬂ  ation—and especially high inﬂ  ation—have been amply 
3  This is the term suggested by Arturo O’Connel in commenting on a prior version of this paper.6  DESA Working Paper No. 9
registered in the developing world. The same holds true for the effects of exchange-rate crises, as capital 
ﬂ  ight guarantees adequate protection to the rich, while exchange rate adjustments, exacerbated by capital 
ﬂ  ight, redistribute the burden of external debt servicing to other social sectors.
The “lost decade” of the 1980s in large parts of the developing world and the strong macro-
economic ups and downs of the 1990s made it clear that real instability (i.e. acute business cycles) also 
carries high social costs. Recessions provoke a disorganization of social services provided by the state; a 
rapid rise in unemployment and poverty rates which decrease only slowly during later periods of econom-
ic recovery; permanent loss in human capital of those unemployed or underemployed, which could lead 
to their structural unemployment or underemployment and, in critical conditions, drop-outs from schools, 
which becomes a permanent loss of opportunity. Furthermore, real instability severely punishes smaller 
enterprises through their unstable access to credit, among other factors.
Consistency of policies with macroeconomic stability, understood in a broad sense (see below), 
is therefore necessary to achieve development objectives. Actually, when the economy is undergoing 
recession, unemployment, increasing inﬂ  ation or a balance-of-payment crisis, long-term programmes and 
objectives tend to become subordinate to short-term macroeconomic policies aimed at overcoming differ-
ent manifestations of macroeconomic instability. A context characterized by stability and consistency of 
policies broadens the temporal horizons of individuals, ﬁ  rms and authorities and, therefore, facilitates the 
proper functioning of democracy.
Stability and consistency of policies are necessary, but not sufﬁ  cient, conditions for better social 
performance in a democratic context, however. In particular, many of the structural targets formulated 
during the period of economic reforms in the developing world lack clear social dimensions or even have 
negative implications—particularly when they are aimed at reducing the size of the state at the cost of 
sacriﬁ  cing social policy. The conﬂ  ict is, therefore, not between social policy, on the one hand, and macro-
economic stability and consistency, on the other, but between macroeconomic inconsistency and long run 
priorities (United Nations, 2001).
Moreover, as the foregoing discussion indicates, low inﬂ  ation and sustainable ﬁ  scal accounts are 
components of macroeconomic stability and consistency, but they are not synonymous (Ocampo, 2002; 
2005). This is an important consideration because the emphasis on macroeconomic stability in recent 
years has focused on these two aspects. Among other examples, in the run-up to their crises of the 1990s, 
Mexico and several South-East Asian economies registered equilibrium or even a ﬁ  scal surplus and low 
inﬂ  ation rates while having an exchange-rate misalignment and an unsustainable current account deﬁ  -
cit associated with large private sector deﬁ  cits (Marfán, 2005). In other cases, where inﬂ  ation and ﬁ  scal 
policy were also controlled, the most serious problem related to the high share of short-term external debt.
All this points to the importance of attaining higher levels of macroeconomic stability, in a broad 
sense, which includes not only ﬁ  scal sustainability and lower levels of inﬂ  ation, but also stability in eco-
nomic growth and in external accounts, as well as sound domestic ﬁ  nancial and external balance sheets. It 
is clear that attaining price stability or rapid growth with overvalued exchange rates is costly in the long run, 
as are pro-cyclical policies which accentuate the effects of external ﬁ  nancial cycles on the domestic econo-
mies, or a very narrow application of the objectives of price stabilization which ignores the costs of transi-
tion that anti-inﬂ  ationary policies may entail. The formulae for achieving stability, in this broader sense of 
the term, are not unique and can result in multiple trade-offs, best resolved by democratic institutions.Market, Social Cohesion, and Democracy  7
National institutions
Market, state and society
The foregoing analysis shows that it is necessary to ﬁ  nd a new balance between the market and the public 
interest. The deﬁ  nition of the realm of the “public interest” takes us, in turn, to classical discussions of the 
functions of the state or, in the terms of the contemporary debates, to institutional development.4 There are 
several possible taxonomies but, for the purpose of this paper, we can use a very simple one that classi-
ﬁ  es the public functions/institutions relevant for an analysis of the relationship between the economy and 
social cohesion, in two broad groups: those that ensure the proper functioning of markets and those that 
ensure consistency between their functioning and social cohesion.
The former can be classiﬁ  ed, in turn, in four sets of functions/institutions, which are certainly 
interrelated: (i) institutions to create markets, i.e. those focused on reducing transaction costs (informa-
tion, negotiation, oversight and control) among economic agents, including granting property rights (in a 
generic sense which includes not only private property but also its limits, and collective property rights in 
the diverse forms that we will analyse below), and on developing legal institutions to check violations of 
these rights or possible conﬂ  icts of interests; (ii) institutions for the provision of public goods, in a general 
sense of the term, which includes the adequate supply not only of pure public goods in terms of welfare 
economics (goods that are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption) but also of those that generate 
positive externalities and enhance the proper management of the public commons; and, on the negative 
side, the reduced supply of “public bads” and of goods generating negative externalities; (iii) institutions 
for microeconomic regulation, particularly in relation to non-competitive market practices, whether on 
account of the presence of scale economies or information problems; as regards the latter, since there is 
never factual information regarding the future (only mere expectations about the future course of events), 
markets involving an inter-temporal dimension (ﬁ  nancial and technological markets, in particular) are es-
sentially imperfect; (iv) institutions for macroeconomic regulation and design of structural strategies and 
policies, aimed at avoiding short-run macroeconomic imbalances (recession and unemployment as well as 
inﬂ  ation, and unsustainable ﬁ  scal or balance-of-payment accounts, and risky public or private sector bal-
ance sheets) and creating appropriate conditions for long-term growth (adequate incentives and ﬁ  nancing 
of innovation, accumulation of human capital and investment, as well as development of complementari-
ties and production linkages).
The functions mentioned include elements of social policy. Thus, human capital generates high 
externalities that play an important role in economic growth. Labour market regulation is another cen-
tral element in macroeconomic regulation and can contribute towards proper macroeconomic regulation. 
However, market operation can give rise to very different distributive results. The concept of a “Pareto op-
timum” of welfare economics is the most concrete expression of the way in which an “efﬁ  cient” outcome, 
from the point of view of markets, can be consistent with different distributions of the beneﬁ  ts. This con-
cept is therefore insufﬁ  cient for an analysis of the relationship between the economy, society and politics.
The functions/institutions which aim at making the workings of the market consistent with social 
cohesion can also be classiﬁ  ed in four categories: (i) those which guarantee adequate provision of goods 
and services that a particular society considers should be provided for all of its members, either because 
of the inﬂ  uence they exercise on their capacities or on their welfare, and that we will call “goods of social 
4  On this aspect, see the new classical texts of Musgrave (1959) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), as well as a more 
recent essay by Rodrik (2001).8  DESA Working Paper No. 9
value”5; (ii) redistributive institutions, which aim at raising the structure of wealth ownership and income 
distribution to levels considered desirable or at least tolerable by society and at establishing rules for the 
functioning of markets, especially markets of factors of production, which could guarantee such outcome; 
(iii) those related to conﬂ  ict management generated by the functioning of markets and to the framing of 
agreements for their management and eventual elimination; (iv) those relating to participation in deci-
sion-making processes, not only relating to distributive outcomes but also to the very functioning of mar-
kets. The latter is essential because, as we have seen, it gives rise to different distributive outcomes, and, 
generally, it is not possible to achieve the desirable distributive results without inﬂ  uencing the functioning 
of markets. It is worth recalling Sen’s observation (1999) that the exercise of political citizenship and the 
speciﬁ  c channels offered by democracy are not only rights which contribute to the well-being of people, 
but they are also the most effective means by which to guarantee that the social objectives of development 
are adequately represented in public decisions. As we will see below, institutions of participation also in-
clude those associated with the contribution of civil society to the fulﬁ  lment of all public functions, either 
as a partner of or substitute for the state.
In the framework of citizens’ rights, “goods of social value” express economic and social rights. 
From there, it follows that these goods are simultaneously rights and commodities and express genuine 
social preferences which go beyond the individual preferences, the starting point of welfare economics. 
Actually, such a deﬁ  nition is arrived at through political processes and expressed as constitutional and 
legal norms. In recent times, the constitutions of Brazil, Colombia and South Africa, among others, con-
cretely express this concept, indicating that such “goods of social value” are part of the social covenant 
underlying political institutions. Moreover, as the possibility of access by the whole population and the 
very deﬁ  nitions of such goods and rights broaden over time, achievements in different historical periods 
must be interpreted in relation to the potential that exists in a particular society at a speciﬁ  c point in time. 
It implies, furthermore, that making such access a reality, when possible, is an ethical imperative.
The basic functions of public policies are, therefore, related to how to guarantee the proper func-
tioning of markets and the consistency between the latter and social cohesion. In this wider sense, “public 
policies” must be understood as all forms of collective action in pursuit of the common interest rather than 
as action exclusively by the state. Accordingly, the “public domain” must be conceived of as the meeting 
point of collective interests rather than as being synonymous with state activities. In other words, “the 
public domain” belongs to society, and not to the state, which is the principal, but not the only instrument 
that society can employ to achieve the objectives of collective development.
In fact, although natural leadership falls on the state, the institutions that may be developed to 
carry out the public functions outlined above must take into account not only the “market failures” which 
lead to these functions but also the “government failures” (and those of other forms of collective action). 
The latter includes problems associated with imperfections of the mechanisms of representation (“agen-
cy” problems, as they have come to be called), the introduction of non-economic and non-social (bureau-
cratic or clientele) rationalities in the functioning of institutions and the reﬂ  ection of dominant economic 
and social interest in their operation (i.e., problems related to political economy), opportunities generated 
by state intervention for capturing rents and information failures equally affecting government action.6 
During periods of state crises, when these shortcomings become marked, it is necessary, therefore, not 
5  This is a redeﬁ  nition of the concept of “merit goods” or “merit wants” used by Musgrave (1959).
6  These are the preferred themes of the new institutional literature relating to the functioning of governments, but 
they have a long tradition in the literature relating to public choice on the use of new institutional approaches.Market, Social Cohesion, and Democracy  9
only to look for improvement in the functioning of the state apparatus but to open up new opportunities 
for the participation of civil society in the exercise of public functions.
This approach underscores the importance of creating a strong institutional framework—a high 
institutional density—with active participation of multiple social actors and adequate accountability to 
the citizenry—i.e. a high democratic density. It creates room both for state institutions and civil society 
and, in each case, for local as well as national, international and supranational institutions, as a result of 
the profound restructuring of the domain of “the public” that has taken place in recent decades. It means, 
in other words, that all sectors of society must participate more actively in democratic public institutions, 
while at the same time developing multiple institutions of their own, which may strengthen the relation 
of solidarity and social responsibility, thus consolidating a culture of mutual understanding and collective 
development.
Development of integrated economic and social policy framework
Market reforms offered only a limited role to social policy and, in particular, paid no attention to the 
distribution of wealth and income and, therefore, to the distributive effects of such reforms. On the other 
hand, equity was central to the alternative proposals formulated by, for example, the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1990; 2001). Over the past few years, 
concern for income and wealth distribution, the productive assets of the poor, the need for a system of 
social protection and the effects of macroeconomic instability among the vulnerable sectors have enriched 
the policy agenda (see, for example, Birdsall, de la Torre and Menezes, 2001; Kuczynski and Williamson, 
2003; De Ferranti and others, 2004).
This is a positive development. Even these recent contributions, however, have not entirely 
overcome a basic problem of social policies promoted during the reform period: the emphasis on the 
instruments (targeting, equivalence criteria between contributions and beneﬁ  ts, decentralization, private 
sector participation), instead of on the principles that ought to guide their design (universality, solidarity, 
efﬁ  ciency and integrated character, in accordance with the ECLAC formulation (see ECLAC, 2001)). This 
has become problematic in some cases, e.g. when private participation in social security systems (health 
and pensions) has not been based on principles of solidarity, when targeting has been used as an instru-
ment for reducing public sector spending rather than as an instrument to guarantee the access of the poor 
to certain fundamental services (and thus facilitate the application of the principle of universality) or when 
decentralization has not fully taken into account regional disparities.
Principles are important because they underline the fact that, as already mentioned, social policy 
is a basic instrument for social cohesion and, therefore, its design must be based on more than economic 
rationality. In any case, as we can see in the recent literature on the positive economic and political links 
between income distribution and economic growth, emphasis on income distribution and social cohesion 
does not preclude economic rationality (Ros, 2000: Chap. 10; World Bank, 2005). Actually, a principal 
corollary of this literature is that inequality may be an important obstacle to economic growth in Latin 
America and Africa, that is fast becoming a problem in some parts of Asia, and more generally, that social 
cohesion is a source of competitive advantage being supplied in increasingly scarce quantities.
The main problems of the recent formulations lie, however, in two areas: inadequate acknowl-
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the fact that economic and social institutions involve more than pure economic rationality. The choice 
of such policies, therefore, must be an explicit decision of citizens through adequately structured demo-
cratic institutions. Actually, in a more fundamental sense, political institutions that facilitate the exercise 
of democratic choice in selecting economic and social institutions are among the most important in any 
society. They give full meaning to the term “ownership” of development policies, a concept very much in 
fashion in recent international debates. In any case, as has been underscored in the ﬁ  rst section of this pa-
per, it is obvious that political “voluntarism”, political populism and “facile macroeconomics” have never 
served as adequate paths for economic and social progress and, therefore, the options chosen must, as we 
have seen, obey principles of rationality and macroeconomic consistency.
The idea that social objectives ought to be included in economic policy is contrary to the model 
of “leader/follower” that characterizes the design of macroeconomic policies today, according to which 
the latter is determined ﬁ  rst, and social policy is left to address their ensuing social effects (Mkandawire, 
2001). The importance attached to designing “safety nets” in place of broader systems of social protec-
tion, with an emphasis on the application of principles of universality and solidarity—and, ultimately, the 
creation of modern welfare states—is also a reﬂ  ection of the vision of social policy’s being subordinate to 
market reforms.
This is also characteristic of many other debates, especially those on labour market regulations. 
Undoubtedly, the need for institutional designs that can facilitate adaptation to changing economic cir-
cumstances ought to be taken into account in the design of labour institutions; however, traditional labour 
market ﬂ  exibility (and, especially the ﬂ  exibility to lay off workers) is only one of the possible alternatives, 
and one that can be applied in varying degrees and through different modalities. Its weak points relate to 
its negative effects on the accumulation of social capital by ﬁ  rms, on workers’ commitment to the suc-
cess of the enterprises they work for and on the harmonious relations between the workers, owners and 
managers of the enterprises. In recent debates, it has been increasingly felt that this ﬂ  exibility ought to be 
accompanied by increasing investment in workers’ training and strong social protection. Other alterna-
tives include cooperation between workers and enterprises to enable adaptation to changing circumstances 
through social dialogue both in their own work places and at local and national levels. Moreover, labour 
market ﬂ  exibility should never be considered a substitute for adequate macroeconomic policies that gener-
ate employment. In an unstable macroeconomic environment, additional ﬂ  exibility may result in a marked 
deterioration in the quality of employment with unclear beneﬁ  ts for the quantity of formal employment, 
which is intended as its main objective.
In view of the link between economic and social development, it is necessary to design integrated 
policy frameworks that take into account the links among different social policies and between economic 
and social policies. Many analysts have pointed out the lack of appropriate institutions in this area, includ-
ing those involved in the recent World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization, which 
in its 2004 report called for “policy coherence”, both at the national and the international levels. These 
integrated frameworks ought to start by designing rules to ensure the “visibility” of the social effects 
of economic policies and by asking macroeconomic authorities (including autonomous central banks) 
to regularly examine the effects of policies on the main social variables (particularly employment and 
income of workers). Similarly, ﬁ  nance ministers should be asked to include an analysis of the distribu-
tive effects in any budgetary or tax reform initiative they present to their legislative authorities. Likewise, 
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who the beneﬁ  ciaries of their programmes should be. These exercises must be considered only as start-
ing points for designing efﬁ  cient coordination systems between economic and social authorities, in which 
social objectives are effectively mainstreamed into economic policy decision making, i.e. into monetary, 
ﬁ  scal, production and technological policies.
Besides these considerations, the recognition that economic and social institutions have multiple 
objectives, and some that go beyond their economic role, is essential. Thus labour market institutions 
have objectives that go beyond the creation of formal employment. As has been pointed out, the quality of 
employment, the promotion of cooperation between workers and enterprises and the distributive effects 
of those institutions are equally important objectives. On this question, it should be noted that labour 
market liberalization has been one of the principal forces behind the tendency towards the deterioration 
of income distribution in a broad range of countries and that centralized negotiations of salaries has acted 
as a defence mechanism against this tendency in a few countries (Cornia, 2004). Moreover, beyond their 
role in negotiations on labour conditions, trade unions are one of the most important mechanisms of social 
participation.
Fiscal covenant and state rationality
Public ﬁ  nances are central to all democratic processes. The strength or weakness of public ﬁ  nances reﬂ  ect 
the strength or weakness of the “ﬁ  scal covenant”, which contributes to a legitimization of the role of the 
state and to a deﬁ  nition of the area of governmental responsibilities in the economic and social spheres 
(ECLAC, 1998). In fact, the absence of a generally accepted pattern of state functions erodes the consen-
sus on the quantity and composition of the resources that the state has to manage, as well as on the rules 
for their allocation and utilization. Therefore, political agreement between different social sectors on what 
the state should do helps to legitimize the level, composition and direction of public spending, and the tax 
burden necessary for its functioning.
Seen in this context, the “ﬁ  scal covenant” must include ﬁ  ve distinct elements: (i) clear rules of 
ﬁ  scal discipline, accompanied by adequate tax revenues to ﬁ  nance the functions that society assigns to the 
state; (ii) transparency of public expenditure;7 (iii) the design of efﬁ  ciency criteria for the management of 
state resources; (iv) acknowledgement of the central role played by the public budget in the provision of 
“goods of social value” and, more generally, in the distribution of income; and (v) the design of balanced 
and democratic ﬁ  scal institutions, which include room for citizens’ participation.
The ﬁ  rst of these criteria must be reﬂ  ected in targets for balanced budgets or deﬁ  cits that are 
sustainable in time or, alternatively, in limits on public debt, within a multi-year budgeting framework that 
serves to make the action plans of the state more orderly. This operation should not, however, be inconsis-
tent with the use of ﬁ  scal policy in the short run to smooth out the business cycle.
In any event, budgetary rules must be accompanied by an adequate allocation of resources for the 
fulﬁ  lment of the basic functions that society assigns to the state. In fact, many developing countries have a 
tendency to burden the state with objectives while providing it with too few resources to fulﬁ  l them, thus 
giving rise to unsustainable ﬁ  scal imbalances and non-compliance of governmental programmes, both of 
which are damaging for democracy. This reﬂ  ects the absence of a culture of responsibility of the citizenry 
7  Transparency implies, on the one hand, inclusion of all the items of expenditure within public budgets, including 
those of a contingent nature or those that result from the multiple tax beneﬁ  ts typically contemplated in tax 
legislation and, on the other hand, public awareness of such budgets, their execution and evaluation.12  DESA Working Paper No. 9
vis-à-vis the state and, especially, tax responsibility—in other words, of a culture of civic responsibility 
which, as we have seen, is the counterpart of citizens’ rights.
That is why, in countries where tax rates and, consequently, levels of public spending are relative-
ly low compared to international patterns, the “ﬁ  scal covenant” almost invariably requires a raising of the 
tax burden and, in particular, a strengthening of the less developed tax sources (direct taxes in general). 
The lack of a culture of tax responsibility also encourages the tendency to overburden tax legislation with 
exceptions. Hence the convenience of limiting speciﬁ  c beneﬁ  ts, of including in the budget an estimate 
of the costs of the tax beneﬁ  ts established by legislation and, of course, of severely punishing those who 
violate tax norms.
Fiscal institutions must pursue the above-mentioned objectives simultaneously. They must strive 
for ﬁ  scal discipline, but also guarantee income levels compatible with the functions of the state arising 
from the democratic process and offer incentives for the proper use of public sector resources. Placing 
these responsibilities on the shoulders of a few organs of central power—especially strong ﬁ  nance minis-
tries—has not proven to be adequate in practice, because it does not ensure that a culture of discipline and 
proper use of resources permeates the entire structure of the state. It even encourages confrontations with-
in the state and a search for quasi-ﬁ  scal practices to evade controls exercised by ﬁ  nance ministries. Even 
more debatable is the idea of assigning this function to an autonomous power—a ﬁ  scal board—which, 
among other things, could be considered an institution that would deprive democracy of one of its most 
essential elements. Indeed, in any democracy, nothing can replace the basic functions of the parliament in 
deﬁ  ning desirable levels of income and public expenditure, or its accountability in ensuring the proper use 
of resources by each organ of the state and by leading government ofﬁ  cials. Accordingly, the promulga-
tion of ﬁ  scal responsibility laws and adoption of explicit ﬁ  scal rules is the most appropriate approach for 
achieving ﬁ  scal discipline. This is equally the case as regards the proper use of resources and, indeed, all 
actions geared towards improving public sector management.
One of the most important corollaries of this analysis is that balanced and democratic ﬁ  scal ar-
rangements require speciﬁ  c actions to strengthen the weakest entities within the budgetary process: the 
legislative power (in most countries), the sub-national governments and the citizenry. This implies that 
it is necessary to promote a broad democratic debate of public sector budgets. The creation of budgetary 
ofﬁ  ces in parliaments as well as mechanisms for citizens’ participation in budgetary debates (including 
participatory budgets), and the involvement of civil society in debates regarding annual or multi-year ﬁ  s-
cal plans (as part and parcel of debates on development plans and strategies) are democratic virtues which 
must be promoted.
Policies on property rights
As has been extensively analysed in the recent institutional literature, while there is no market without 
property rights, neither is there a market which functions in an institutional vacuum. Institutional develop-
ment leads, however, to the creation of regulations that, in some way or another, restrict property rights.
No other area of economic analysis gives rise to so many differences among various schools of 
economic thought as this one, especially on two speciﬁ  c issues: the limits that society must impose on 
large private property (or, according to the formulation used in some institutional contexts, to deﬁ  ne the 
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dimensions: the promotion of small private property and alternative forms of property rights (cooperative 
and communal).
The limits to large private property are related mainly to the strong association between a mal-dis-
tribution of wealth and a mal-distribution of income. Therefore, one set of limits to private property rights 
relates to the levels of inequality in wealth distribution which a society is willing to tolerate and to the 
imposition of taxes on incomes from capital or from wealth as compensatory mechanisms against existing 
inequalities. A second set is related to the possible abuse of market power that large ﬁ  rms can exercise, 
as well as the abuse by large shareholders and executives of companies vis-à-vis small shareholders; the 
corresponding rules of “corporate governance” are thus part of the rules for the proper functioning of 
markets. The third set of limits refers to the capacity of economic power to expand its inﬂ  uence beyond 
markets, thanks to its preferential audience in the political system or to the control it exercises on other 
typical spheres of power in contemporary societies, the mass media in particular. Constitutional and legal 
rules which deﬁ  ne the relationship between economic and political power as well as between economic 
power and the control of the mass media are, therefore, an essential component of policies on large private 
property (or factor in their absence).
In the production of public goods, in the wider sense in which we use this term, or when the 
control of a particular economic sector confers huge power in a particular economy, one of the options 
promoted by some political movements and schools of economic thought has been state ownership. The 
indirect regulation of private ﬁ  rms active in these sectors is one option, but regulatory authorities may 
encounter serious problems of asymmetric information and difﬁ  culties in avoiding the “capture of regula-
tion” by the economic power that controls the respective sector. For this reason, direct ownership by the 
state can be an attractive option.
However, evidence indicates that this option also faces problems associated both with “govern-
ment failures” and with the lack of deﬁ  nition of effective property rights (in this case, public property 
rights). Both problems lead to the control of public sector ﬁ  rms or of some of their operations by speciﬁ  c 
interests (control of their bureaucracies and/or company contracts by speciﬁ  c groups and, in the extreme, 
corruption), thereby resulting in the private appropriation of public enterprises. To this, we must add the 
absence of “hard” budget constraints facing these ﬁ  rms, which can translate into inefﬁ  cient management 
(although this is not the only possible outcome). A similar problem to that which characterizes large 
private enterprises may also arise, although with a twist: political control can generate excessive economic 
control. All of this means that the rules guaranteeing the effective public character of the state enterprises 
and their proper economic functioning are an essential part of a policy on property rights in the broad 
sense of the term.
The defence of collective assets and commons has acquired increasing importance given the 
awareness of the importance of the environment, but it covers a broader group of subjects, amongst which 
the protection of the remaining urban and rural commons is noteworthy. The problem cannot be solved 
with a private allocation of the required assets or commons, mainly because the lack of some markets (for 
environmental services, in particular) would generate inefﬁ  ciencies in the allocation of resources; the lack 
of information on the speciﬁ  c nature of externalities that they generate would, by itself, reduce the ef-
ﬁ  ciency of any regulation; and also because private control of resources could generate the capture of the 
regulatory entities.8 The problem is more complex because the allocation of private property rights over 
8  The controversy over assigning right of private ownership to sources of water is a case in question.14  DESA Working Paper No. 9
some assets can give rise to the general presumption of rights on such assets or services in cases where 
property rights are not clearly deﬁ  ned. One of the most relevant cases in point is ownership of land, since 
proprietors consider that environmental resources that are associated with it, such as water or shifting ﬂ  ora 
and fauna, are integral parts of their rights. This underscores the need for clear constitutional and legal 
norms regarding collective assets and commons and the creation of effective defence mechanisms for the 
collective rights over them.
Promotion of small private ownership is the least controversial element of a policy on property 
rights. Accordingly, it can be argued that the form of private property that is more akin to democracy is 
widely diffused ownership.9 In line with this principle, related policies are the promotion of access to 
ownership of housing, support to small enterprises, both rural and urban, support to small shareholders 
and—something more debatable today than some years ago—the participation of workers in the own-
ership and management of enterprises (which in modern terminology can be conceived of as a means 
through which workers acquire some property rights to the ﬁ  rm they work for).
The promotion of small private property must be closely linked to support to associative forms 
of ownership (cooperatives) which small property holders use to exploit economies of scale in related 
activities (in acquiring inputs or marketing of their products, for example) and, therefore, to compete with 
large ﬁ  rms. The promotion of these alternative forms of property rights also arises from the coexistence 
of modern economies with communal organizations, such as the indigenous communities, as well as from 
the advantages that alternative forms of property rights entail as expressions of a larger domain of “the 
public” (Moulián, 2001).
Democracy, public debate and technocracy
These reﬂ  ections lead us ﬁ  nally to the one related directly to the concept of democracy as diversity: an ef-
fective democracy is not possible if the themes of economy and social organization are not part of its agen-
da. To eliminate such subjects from democracy is to leave it bereft of one of its fundamental dimensions.
This concept, however, conﬂ  icts with some of the most commonly shared ideas in contempo-
rary economic thinking, which can be referred to as “technocratic ideology”. Behind this ideology lies 
a deeply pessimistic vision of democracy as a system of competition for the concession of privileges 
granted by the state—for capturing rents, to use the most common expression. In the face of this reason-
ing, it is desirable to develop economic institutions that are isolated from democracy and even protected 
from it. There is also, in this regard, an undercurrent of intrinsic oligarchic tendency, in a very Platonic 
sense of the term—of the “government of the wise”—which is shared in one way another by all schools 
of economic thought that give a central role in economic decision-making to economic knowledge and to 
the elitist group that controls it—the technocracy (Ocampo, 1992).
Without ruling out the importance of solid technical institutions for the proper functioning of the 
state, and without failing to acknowledge the scientiﬁ  c underpinnings of all economic analysis, the truth 
is that the latter is always coloured by ideology, which divides economics into antagonistic schools of 
thought. For this reason, economics must be subjected to politics and, in particular, to democratic political 
processes, as it is through the latter that society settles its ideological controversies.
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This type of reasoning has three basic implications. First, it is difﬁ  cult to conceive of proper 
democracies without solid political parties that offer citizens alternative options for economic and social 
order. Without this ideological competition, politics will, in the worst of scenarios, become pure clien-
telism and, in the best, electoral competition among potential “public managers”. Might it be the case that 
the increasing incapacity of politics to mobilize people is associated with the elimination of this basic 
substance of politics? Reversing this trend, and injecting more substance into democracy, is essential to 
creating a political sphere that will be more responsive to the needs of development.
To achieve these results, it is necessary to guarantee academic pluralism and create mechanisms 
to transform technical debates into social ones. This is the reason it is so important to facilitate interac-
tion between academic groups and different social organizations and to disseminate the resulting debates 
through the mass media.
The third implication is that the strengthening of technocratic entities and autonomous centres 
of economic power must be accompanied by appropriate political control. One essential element in this 
respect is to strengthen the capacity of the units of political control to exercise this function properly. 
A priority issue in this regard is the development of technical support groups and think tanks for parlia-
ments, political parties, trade unions and popular organizations, as well as for entrepreneurial organiza-
tions. Without such entities, there cannot be an appropriate dialogue with the technical sectors of govern-
ments and central banks. This is one of the priorities of a democratic agenda to which little attention has 
been paid.
The contributions of the recent literature on the “economics of politics” can help us better un-
derstand how political institutions comply with these principles, thus helping to improve the relation-
ship between ideological debates, political programmes, decision-making processes and public policies. 
Accordingly, they contribute to an understanding of the virtues and limits of the institutions developed 
for overcoming the main government failures, especially with regard to ensuring the primacy of general 
versus speciﬁ  c interests, and the interests of the electorate over those of the elected, as well as the effec-
tive capacity to translate preferences into public decisions and policies. The analyses of the functioning 
of parties, of electoral institutions, of rules for the expression of speciﬁ  c interests (lobbying), of counter-
vailing institutional setups and of rules that deﬁ  ne the relationship between powers and decision-making 
processes are some of the critical themes in this context (Persson and Tabellini, 2002). On this subject, 
and in particular, on its relation to economic policies, much more research is needed (in this context, see 
IDB, 2000: Chap. 4).
International institutions
Brief notes on globalization and democracy
The tension between the principle of equality and the protection of property rights has acquired a new 
dimension in the present phase of globalization. The normative “levelling of the playing ﬁ  eld” (homog-
enization) generated by globalization has given a new impetus to the defence of property rights and, more 
especially to the extension, in this area, of the rules of the game of the industrial world. This has been 
reﬂ  ected in a number of treaties relating to protection of investment as well as in a generalization of the 
rules regarding the protection of intellectual property rights.16  DESA Working Paper No. 9
In a world where opportunities for development are unequally distributed, this normative ho-
mogenization has been accompanied by increasing distributive tensions (UNCTAD, 1997; UNDP, 1999; 
Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002; Cornia, 2004). Alternative explanations of these tensions continue to 
be the subject of heated debate. Perhaps the most appropriate explanation lies in the adverse distributive 
effects of market reforms (or of at least some of them) and the simultaneous weakening of the institutions 
of social protection, as well as the increasing reluctance and difﬁ  culties of governments to offer effective 
instruments of social protection (Cornia, 2004). Another explanation is the increasing asymmetry be-
tween the international mobility of some factors of production (capital and highly skilled labour) and the 
restricted mobility of others (low-skilled labour), which generates adverse distributive effects against the 
latter (Rodrik, 1997). Increase in income differentials according to the relative demand for skilled labour 
is the third explanation, and the one that generates perhaps the broadest consensus among analysts.
It must be remembered, however, in the face of these trends, that the present phase of globaliza-
tion is a multidimensional phenomenon that has also included a global extension of common ethical 
principles and international objectives of a social character, which have been upheld in declarations and 
international conventions on human rights as well as in the declarations and action plans of the United 
Nations conferences and summits, including the Millennium Summit (United Nations, 2000), which have 
generated what can be called the United Nations development agenda. These processes and this agenda 
are rooted, furthermore, in the history of struggle by international civil society to ensure human rights, 
social equity, gender equality, environmental protection and, more recently, globalization of solidarity and 
the “right to be different” (cultural diversity).
This “globalization of values”, as ECLAC (2001) has called it, has helped the spread of demo-
cratic regimes and a broader vision of citizenship across the world. The coincidence of this process with 
the liberalization of market forces has, however, generated tensions without creating mechanisms for their 
attenuation. The basic reason for this is that the globalization process, while promoting democracy and 
setting internationally agreed social goals and targets, has eroded the capacity of action of governments 
to meet these targets; it has reduced the “policy space”, to express this problem in the terms that have be-
come common since the Eleventh United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD XI), 
held in São Paulo in 2004. Globalization has left the complex task of maintaining social cohesion in the 
hands of the nation-states, but with less room for manoeuvre to realize it. Moreover, as a result of norma-
tive homogenization and the burden of conditionality in international ﬁ  nancial assistance, the scope for 
diversity required by democracy has been reduced.
As has become evident in recent controversies on international ﬁ  nancial instability, these dilem-
mas are only ﬁ  nally resolved by strengthening global governance. But current trends do not point in this 
direction. There are, on the one hand, problems of representation of developing countries in international 
economic decision making, which were been recognized at the Monterrey International Conference on 
Financing for Development (United Nations, 2002). On the other hand, there are no processes that would 
create opportunities for directly consulting citizens on economic decisions of a global character—that is 
to say, for going beyond the representation of citizens through their governments. Furthermore, indepen-
dently of these problems, there are no strong forces at work for strengthening global economic governance.
The absence of a true internationalization of politics is, in this sense, the main paradox charac-
terizing the current globalization process. In other words, the simultaneous accentuation of democratic 
forces and distributive tensions has not been accompanied by any effective strengthening of political 
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ent spaces of global citizenship associated with the struggle of international civil society, their capacity to 
transform reality continues to depend on their incidence on national political processes.
This has profound implications for the international order. It implies, ﬁ  rst of all, that it is neces-
sary to create democratic spaces of a supranational character. This process will inevitably be slow, how-
ever—as reﬂ  ected, for example, by the most advanced supranational process in the world, the European 
Union (EU). For this reason, and while the expressions of political citizenship continue to be essentially 
national in character, the promotion of democracy as a universal value acquires meaning today only if 
national representation and participation processes are allowed to determine economic and social devel-
opment strategies, and if they are able to exercise an effective mediation of the tensions created by the 
globalization process. This means, in turn, that the international order must be profoundly respectful of 
diversity, within the limits of interdependence. It also implies that an essential function of international or-
ganizations is to support national strategies that may contribute to reducing, through political citizenship, 
the profound tensions existing today between the principle of equality and the functioning of the global-
ized markets.
The demands for economic and social rights and international assistance
In the human rights framework that underlies this paper, the building of a social agenda is identiﬁ  ed with 
the acknowledgement that each member of the society is a citizen and, therefore, is a depository of rights. 
The international scope of declarations and conventions on human rights as well as the United Nations de-
velopment agenda that has evolved from the global conferences and summits can, therefore, be considered 
as a basis for a deﬁ  nition of a concept of global citizenship, albeit and incipient one.
In this area, however, there has not been a full transition from national to international institu-
tions. In actual fact, respect for human rights and the accountability for meeting internationally agreed 
social goals continue to be essentially national responsibilities. On the other hand, the application of these 
obligations is limited to the state and does not explicitly cover other social agents. Lastly, there are as yet 
no clear incentives for the enforcement of these rights and commitments, nor are there methods to guaran-
tee their application in each nation-state.
One essential activity in this ﬁ  eld relates to the production, dissemination and analysis of infor-
mation regarding the situation of economic, social and cultural rights—and to the provision of “goods of 
social value” through which the former are expressed—as well to the compliance with goals and targets 
set in global summits. These periodic evaluations ought to be subject to debate in representative national 
forums, with the active participation of parliaments and civil society. A process of this kind will contribute 
to the creation of a culture of accountability for international commitments whose effectiveness depends 
on their ability to bring about necessary adjustments in public policies. In this manner, accountability in 
all of these ﬁ  elds will contribute to a much clearer political demand for international commitments. Ac-
cordingly, the mechanisms designed for the follow-up to the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals, and the political visibility of these goals, represent signiﬁ  cant progress. It would be important, 
therefore, to build upon this experience and create broader mechanisms of accountability, which may 
then eventually lead to an integral evaluation covering not only respect for declarations and conventions 
on human rights but also for other sets of internationally agreed social rights (the fundamental principles 
and rights of work agreed upon in the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the rights of children, 
women and ethnic groups) and the goals and targets agreed to in world summits that belong to the United 
Nations development agenda, with which they are closely related.18  DESA Working Paper No. 9
In some cases, this political demand could gradually lead to a judicial demand for economic and 
social rights, both in national and in relevant international courts. Europe has been the only place in the 
world where this step has been taken. In all cases, as stated before, present and future commitments and 
the consequent political demands for them must be in consonance with the degree of development of the 
countries concerned, and especially with their capacity to attain goals which could effectively beneﬁ  t all 
citizens, while avoiding both political voluntarism and populism, and facile macroeconomics.
It is also important to acknowledge that the responsibility for the full application of social rights 
and goals transcends state borders. That is why some international organizations have undertaken new ini-
tiatives, including the dissemination of the concept of corporate social responsibility. One such concrete 
example is the United Nations Global Compact, through which subscribing enterprises commit them-
selves to promote respect for human rights in their sphere of activity, to comply with basic labour rights, 
to protect the environment and to ﬁ  ght corruption. Another example is the guidelines for multinational 
companies prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2001. 
These processes have been accompanied by strictly private initiatives from both business sectors and 
social movements.10 These principles of and commitments to corporate social responsibility have become 
subject to regular follow up by different organizations. It is worth adding, however, that signiﬁ  cant con-
troversy still persists between those (mainly non- governmental organizations) who advocate schemes of 
corporate social responsibility of a compulsory character and business organizations who prefer voluntary 
frameworks of “best practices” which will spread through emulation.
On the other hand, the marked inequalities and asymmetries of the global order indicate that 
an essential element in the realization of rights and goals at the world level in the social area is ofﬁ  cial 
development assistance (ODA). ODA ought to be made available in conformity with the commitments set 
at the United Nations (to grant ofﬁ  cial assistance equivalent to 0.7 per cent of the gross domestic income 
of developed countries) and with the basic criteria shared by the international community, which were 
clearly spelled out at the Monterrey conference: assigning priority to the ﬁ  ght against poverty and “own-
ership” of the strategies and policies of economic and social development by the countries that adopt them 
(United Nations, 2002). From this perspective, development cooperation must be conceived as a simulta-
neous support to poverty eradication and to the construction of democracy, in accordance with a rights-
based approach.
A complementary approach lies in the explicit acknowledgement that globalization will not 
achieve the aim of contributing to the convergence of the development levels of different countries if it 
is not accompanied by resource ﬂ  ows explicitly intended for this purpose. The EU represents an interna-
tional process in which these principles have crystallized through their policy of “social cohesion”. It is 
symptomatic of the political philosophy underlying these agreements that the deepening of economic inte-
gration during the last decade of the twentieth century was accompanied by a strengthening of the policy 
regarding cohesion (Marín, 1999). There is, however, no other process of this type outside the European 
context. That is why, as argued by some analysts, it would be desirable to extend this practice to other 
integration processes (see, for example, Bustillo and Ocampo, 2004, in relation to an eventual free trade 
area of the Americas).
10  Relevant initiatives include the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the International Certiﬁ  cation on Environmental 
Management ISO14001 and the Corporative Accountability Index, promoted by the British ﬁ  rm, Business and the 
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Conditionality in international ﬁ  nancial assistance
The analysis of international resources leads us to the debate on the conditionality attached to internation-
al ﬁ  nancial assistance and the relationship of such conditionality with national processes of participation 
and political representation. The conclusions of recent debates emphatically indicate that conditionality is 
not an effective, or at least is an insufﬁ  cient, means to fulﬁ  l those objectives that the international com-
munity wants to tie to ﬁ  nancial assistance. If there is no true “ownership” of policies (in other words, if 
they do not enjoy strong domestic support), it is unlikely they will be sustained. Furthermore, ownership 
is essential for institution-building, which is now widely acknowledged as one of the key factors for the 
success of development policies.
The particular meaning of this principle, however, has been the subject of great controversy and 
has in practice been ignored in many cases. There have even been attempts to “force” on recipient coun-
tries the “ownership” of policies that donors and international organizations consider appropriate (Hel-
leiner, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). In any case, the principle of “ownership” establishes the basic rule for the 
donors: their role is not to replace but to support national processes of participation and political repre-
sentation. This has led to the acceptance of “ownership” as a central theme of ODA (OECD/DAC, 1996) 
and of IMF and World Bank programmes (Köhler and Wolfensohn, 2000; World Bank, 1998; IMF, 2001). 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 has recently raised this principle to the level of a basic 
criterion for ODA.
A full application of this principle requires a clear understanding of the way conditionality 
operates in reducing, eliminating or distorting the “ownership” of national policies. The mechanism is 
not—or at least not always, or not mainly—a plain and simple imposition of policies by the donors. In 
actual fact, four additional channels are decisive: (i) the terms under which ﬁ  nancing is available severely 
restrict countries’ options; (ii) in a crisis situation, possible support from donors and international ﬁ  nan-
cial institutions affects discussions within the government, increasing the negotiating power of groups 
more inclined towards the points of view of the donors; (iii) technical support that institutions provide to 
countries affects domestic discussions, and (iv) participation of representatives from these institutions also 
inﬂ  uences these debates.
In this manner, for “ownership” of policies to become consistent with international ﬁ  nancial 
assistance, two additional conditions must be met: (i) a strict ban must be established against any form 
of conditionality that goes beyond the factors directly affecting the objectives of the programme being ﬁ  -
nanced;11 and (ii) countries must have at their disposal alternative packages of reform and adjustment, and 
international institutions must be available to supply such alternative support whenever countries ask for 
it, with the same technical rigor as is the case for traditional reform programmes. The composition of the 
international ﬁ  nancial institutions’ technical teams must therefore represent the heterogeneous approaches 
to macroeconomic and structural adjustment, and/or these institutions must be ready to tap organizations 
and economists who think differently to help them design alternative programmes. This implies, further-
more, that “ownership” can only be promoted through an effective pluralist discussion of the virtues of 
alternative macroeconomic and structural reform packages (Stiglitz, 1999).
11  In this regard, one difﬁ  culty encountered in discussions and decisions of the IMF aimed at streamlining 
conditionality, is the fact that, although the IMF concentrates on macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial matters, it is also 
involved with the institutional and structural aspects that are supposedly related to them. Such a broad deﬁ  nition 
was responsible for increasing the scope of conditionality during recent decades.20  DESA Working Paper No. 9
On the other hand, the inclusion of social criteria in designing the programmes of international 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, especially their emphasis on poverty reduction as an explicit objective of interna-
tional cooperation, represents a signiﬁ  cant improvement in these programmes. It is essential, however, 
that this should not lead to new forms of conditionality or to the promotion of a particular approach to 
social programmes in the developing world. In particular, the inclusion of social issues in macroeconomic 
and structural adjustment programmes cannot be limited to designing adequate social safety nets for 
social sectors affected by macroeconomic crises or structural adjustment, the issue that has received great-
est attention. In fact, the compensatory approach of the social programmes has been seriously questioned 
(United Nations, 2001). Rather, as has been argued throughout this paper, it should lead to mainstreaming 
social objectives in the very design of macroeconomic policies and structural reforms.
Conclusion
The citizens’ rights framework that serves as the stepping stone of this paper bears a great resemblance to 
other contemporary visions of development. The concept of “human development” (UNDP, 1994), “devel-
opment as freedom” (Sen, 1999) and the integral character of development (ECLAC, 2001) are various 
expressions of this perspective, but it has profound roots in the debates on development. As we have indi-
cated, during the last two decades, it has been manifested mainly in the form of a gradual dissemination 
of global ideas and values like human rights, sustainable development, gender equality, and respect for 
ethnic and cultural diversity. Global values and, above all, human rights, in their dual dimension of civil 
and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other, must be con-
sidered as the ethical framework for the formulation of development policies and for any political order.
The consequences of this new perspective are deeper than what most economists are ready to 
accept. Following Polanyi (1957), this basically means that the economic system must be subordinated 
to broader social objectives. This afﬁ  rmation underscores the need to confront the powerful centrifugal 
forces that characterize the private sphere today. Thus, in many (developing and industrialized) countries, 
people are losing their sense of belonging to their society, their identiﬁ  cation with collective objectives 
and their bonds of solidarity. This underscores the importance of “creating society”, of a broadening 
awareness of the social responsibility of individuals and groups, based on initiatives which could come 
from the state as well as civil society. Accordingly, as we have argued, the domain of “the public” must be 
seen as the meeting point of collective interests more than as synonymous with the activities of the state. 
This means that the domain of “the public” belongs to the society, not to the state, which, while being the 
principal actor, is only one of the tools used by society to attain its collective development.
Another implication of this point of view is that economic and social institutions must be sub-
jected to democratic political choice. This implies that there is no such thing as a unique or optimum 
design for a “market economy”. As has been noted by a number of authors, there are different “varieties 
of capitalism” and it is not clear that any one form is superior to the others in every way—not only in rela-
tion to dynamism and economic stability but to distribution of income and social cohesion. Controversies 
over the virtues of different economic institutions indicate that economists are profoundly immersed in 
ideological debates, which can and must be resolved in the democratic arena. In that context, the role of 
international cooperation, of national and international technocracies—and, incidentally, of international 
markets—is neither to promote nor, even less so, to dictate a dominant model of economic and social 
organization.Market, Social Cohesion, and Democracy  21
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